Customer Discrimination and Employment Outcomes: Theory and Evidence from the French Labor Market by Combes, Pierre-Philippe et al.
Customer Discrimination and Employment Outcomes:
Theory and Evidence from the French Labor Market
Pierre-Philippe Combes, Bruno Decreuse, Morgane Laouenan, Alain Trannoy
To cite this version:
Pierre-Philippe Combes, Bruno Decreuse, Morgane Laouenan, Alain Trannoy. Customer Dis-
crimination and Employment Outcomes: Theory and Evidence from the French Labor Market.
2011. <halshs-00624435>
HAL Id: halshs-00624435
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00624435
Submitted on 17 Sep 2011
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
1 
 
 
 
GREQAM 
Groupement de Recherche en Economie 
Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - UMR-CNRS 6579 
Ecole des Hautes études en Sciences Sociales 
Universités d'Aix-Marseille II et III 
Document de Travail  
n°2011-36 
Customer Discrimination and Employment 
Outcomes: Theory and Evidence from the 
French Labor Market 
 
 
 
Pierre-Philippe Combes 
Bruno Decreuse  
Morgane Laouenan  
Alain Trannoy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
September 2011 
Customer Discrimination and Employment Outcomes: Theory
and Evidence from the French Labor Market∗
Pierre-Philippe Combes† Bruno Decreuse‡
Morgane Laouenan§ Alain Trannoy¶
September 2011
Abstract
The paper investigates the link between the over-exposure of African immigrants to unem-
ployment in France and their under-representation in jobs in contact with customers. We build
a two-sector matching model with ethnic sector-speciﬁc preferences, economy-wide employer dis-
crimination, and customer discrimination in jobs in contact with customers. The outcomes of
the model allow us to build a test of ethnic discrimination in general and customer discrimina-
tion in particular. We run the test on French individual data in a cross-section of Employment
Areas. Our results show that there is customer discrimination in the French labor market for
contact jobs; a decrease in discrimination intensity by one standard deviation would reduce the
raw unemployment rate of African immigrants by 4.3 percentage points.
JEL classiﬁcation: J15, J61, R23
Keywords: Customer Discrimination, Matching Frictions, Jobs in contact, Ethnic Unemploy-
ment.
∗This paper has beneﬁted from discussions with Jon Guryan, Ruben Hernandez, Kevin Lang, Robert Margo,
Benoit Schmutz and Yves Zenou. We also wish to thank seminar participants at Boston University, University of
Aix-Marseilles, Sciences-Po and Centre d'Etudes de l'Emploi, as well as participants to the LAGV conference in
Marseilles, to the EEA conference in Glasgow and to the Journées d'Economie Spatiale in Dijon. Data was made
available by the Centre Maurice Halbwachs. This research was partly funded by the Direction de l'Animation de la
Recherche, des Etudes et des Statistiques (Dares). The usual caveat applies.
†GREQAM, Aix-Marseille Université, CEPR, ppcombes@univmed.fr
‡GREQAM, Aix-Marseille Université, decreuse@univmed.fr
§GREQAM, Aix-Marseille Université, Sciences-Po, morgane.laouenan@sciences-po.org
¶GREQAM, Aix-Marseille Université, EHESS, alain.trannoy@univmed.fr
1
1 Introduction
The serious consequences of a widespread prejudice against a minority group come readily to mind.
In the long run, a divided society can emerge with a part of the population feeling itself to be excluded
from the beneﬁts of prosperity and inclusion. In France, African immigrants (ﬁrst generation) and
those whose parents were born in an African country (second generation) number about 5 million.
They mainly originate from former French colonies and come from poor social backgrounds; prejudice
against them is deeply rooted in the colonial past. It is not far-fetched to surmise that this prejudice
can persist in generations that did not experience colonization. The broad goal of the paper is to
explore the causal implication of this prejudice on the labor-market outcome diﬀerentials between
Afro-French and French natives.
African immigrants are both under-represented in jobs involving contact with customers (here-
after, contact jobs) and over-exposed to unemployment. The ethnic diﬀerential rate of occupation
in contact jobs is about 10 percentage points; the unemployment rate diﬀerential between Africans
and French natives also amounts to about 11 percentage points. Most of such diﬀerentials cannot
be explained by the uneven distribution of skills between these two ethnic groups (Aeberhardt et al,
2009). It is tempting to connect the two ethnic diﬀerentials in one way or another. This leads to the
following conjecture: people with African origins are discriminated against in contact jobs, thereby
reducing dramatically the set of employment opportunities oﬀered to them. The comparison with
immigrants of other origin militates in favor of such an explanation. Unlike African immigrants,
European immigrants have the same probability of being employed and of being in contact with
customers as French natives. They are much less inclined to suﬀer from ethnic prejudice since they
come from countries which have not been dominated by the French. Obviously, this crude compari-
son is not enough to convince the reader of the robustness of the link between the two deﬁcits the
African immigrants suﬀer from. The aim of the paper is to investigate this conjecture in depth.
Let us emphasize that under-representation in a speciﬁc occupation does not mean that a group is
discriminated against. Suppose for instance that Africans and French natives are seemingly identical
except for color and that there are two types of jobs, with and without contact with consumers. If
African immigrants do not like contact jobs as much as French natives, then they will be naturally
under-represented in such jobs. In a perfect labor market, such sectorial tastes for jobs have no
eﬀects on overall unemployment risks. However, in a context of job scarcity turning down a number
of potential oﬀers may translate into lower chances of having a job. This can explain and relate
the two facts reported above without even appealing to discrimination. The lesson of this thought
experiment is that ethnic-speciﬁc sectorial preferences need to be accounted for before properly
assessing discrimination.
If this conjecture were established, it would call for some public policy intervention because
without it the phenomenon can sustain. As highlighted by Becker (1957), the type of discrimination
matters in the long run. In the case of employer discrimination, employers hold a `taste' for dis-
crimination, meaning that they see a disutility in employing minority workers. However, employer
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discrimination is costly for the ﬁrm and its shareholders and so it tends to recede over time, at least
if the competition is suﬃciently ﬁerce. In case of customer discrimination, employers internalize the
customers' prejudice against workers coming from a minority. Customer discrimination is rooted in
proﬁt maximization and, therefore, tends to persist. Moreover, deindustrialization and the growth of
the consumer service sector mean that job opportunities are increasingly exposed to public contact.
The share of contact jobs has been on the rise over the past forty years in France: The share of un-
skilled contact jobs went from 31.6% in 1968 to 52.7% in 1999. Improving employment opportunities
for African immigrants will prove diﬃcult if they are excluded from half the jobs.
The above observations show that two other phenomena can compete in explaining the under-
representation of African immigrants in contact jobs, that is employer discrimination and ethnic
speciﬁc preferences in some occupations. This paper is an attempt to single out customer discrimi-
nation from these two competing explanations. We develop a theoretical model that provides a way
to test for the presence of customer discrimination in a frictional labor market. We then run the test
on French data and ﬁnd evidence of customer discrimination with sizable implications for African
unemployment and occupations.
There is a growing literature on ethnic discrimination in the French labor market despite the
fact that the French Constitution prohibits the collection of data on ethnic groups and so public
datasets provide imperfect information on minorities. A ﬁrst piece of evidence comes from audit
studies that show that African workers have a lower chance of being interviewed, all else being
equal (see, e.g., Cediey and Foroni, 2007; Duguet et al, 2009). Very few studies use survey data
and document the over-exposure of African workers to unemployment risk (see, e.g., Aeberhardt
et al, 2009; Algan et al, 2009). The main message of these papers is that residual unemployment
disparity is very high, whereas residual wage disparity is much more tenuous. Our analysis focuses
on unemployment disparity rather than on wage disparity because it is reasonable to postulate that,
if any, discrimination in the French labor market translates into employment rationing instead of
wage reductions.
Section 2 presents a two-sector model (with and without contact with consumers), with two
ethnic groups (Africans and French natives), sector-speciﬁc abilities that diﬀer across ethnic groups,
employer discrimination, and customer discrimination in contact jobs. The model is based on four
key identifying assumptions. The ﬁrst is that there is discrimination of some kind if and only if the
the pool of prejudiced jobs in the whole population strictly increases with the proportion of French
natives. This phenomenon may simply result from a size eﬀect: at given prejudiced proportion in
the French-native population, the number of discriminating individuals increases with the share of
French natives. However, the phenomenon may also arise when prejudice among French natives
decreases with exposure to African immigrants.1 One way to rationalize this assumption is to con-
1In the US, the assumption that the proportion of prejudiced individuals grows with the proportion of Non-Blacks
would be incorrect. For instance, Charles and Guryan (2008) show that Blacks live disproportionately in regions of the
country in which racial prejudice is the most severe. This pattern is caused in part by historical reasons. Sundstrom
(2007) shows that counties where blacks are a large share of the workforce used to be some plantation farming areas and
were characterized by a strong tradition of hierarchical race relations where voters expressed segregationist preferences
3
sider that African employers are more likely to hire African employees than French-native employers.
Provided that the proportion of African employers decreases with the Non-African proportion, the
likelihood of suﬀering from employer discrimination also decreases with such a proportion.2 The
second assumption is that the sensitivity of employer discrimination vis-à-vis the proportion of
prejudiced people does not vary across sectors. We actually need a weaker property: employer dis-
crimination in contact jobs must not be more responsive to changes in the proportion of prejudiced
people than in the rest of the economy.3 The third assumption is that customer discrimination
only arises in the context of contact jobs. Prejudiced consumers do not care about workers with
whom they do not interact. The ﬁnal assumption is that employer type as well as consumer type
cannot be perfectly observed. We consider two popular ways to model job search. We start with the
case where search is undirected; matching is random as a result. We then examine the case where
search is directed towards a particular sector. There, workers self-select across sectors according to
comparative advantage.
The model predicts ethnic-speciﬁc unemployment rates and ethnic-speciﬁc distribution of oc-
cupations as functions of three local labor market characteristics: a) the probability of locating a
vacancy; b) the proportion of jobs involving contact with consumers; c) the proportion of French-
native residents. The model provides a way to test the existence of ethnic discrimination and whether
it is at least partly due to consumer tastes. We rely on the two following theoretical outcomes of
the model.
First, if the ethnic diﬀerential unemployment probability is positively aﬀected by the proportion
of Non-African residents, then there is ethnic (either customer or employer) discrimination.
Second, there is customer discrimination if and only if there is ethnic discrimination and the
ethnic diﬀerential probability of working in a contact job is negatively impacted by the proportion
of French natives.
On the theoretical side, our paper completes the literature on discrimination in frictional envi-
ronments. The key insight from this literature is the following: when the labor market is frictional,
labor market mobility is reduced and discrimination in a suﬃciently large group of ﬁrms increases
the odds of unemployment. Most of the papers focus on employer discrimination and its implications
for wage diﬀerentials (see Black, 1995, Bowlus and Eckstein, 2002, Rosen, 2003, and Dickens et al,
2005).4
in the 1948 presidential election.
2The 1990 French Census gives credit to this argument. Let us name `employers' people whose occupation number
is 21 (craftsmen), 22 (corporate managers), 23 (shopkeepers). At employment area level, a one-standard-deviation
increase in the Non-African proportion increases the proportion of African employers by 0.82 of its standard deviation.
The results are marginally aﬀected when we remove craftsmen from the employer group.
3In the US, an employer is required to ﬁle an Employer Information Report to the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission if it employs 100 or more employees. Therefore, large ﬁrms should be more inclined to
improve the fraction of minority hires. If we suppose that jobs in contact with consumers are mostly in smaller ﬁrms,
it suggests that employer discrimination could be stronger in this sector. However, such Anti-Discrimination Laws
have not been implemented yet in France.
4In Rosen (2003), workers and ﬁrms bargain over the wage, while Black (1995), Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) and
Dickens et al (2005) assume that ﬁrms post non-negotiable wages along with jobs.
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Section 3 tests our model on French data at the Employment Area5 level. Our paper uses the 1990
French census and examines how the individual probability of being unemployed and the individual
probability of working in a contact job respond to the local discriminatory forces. Importantly, we
consider both the local share of contact jobs and the local proportion of Non-African population
as the two discriminatory forces, enabling the discriminating channel to be identiﬁed. The latter
variable comes directly from our ﬁrst identifying assumption. We develop a two-step procedure. In
the ﬁrst step, we regress individual labor market outcomes on a set of individual characteristics, on
EA ﬁxed-eﬀects, and on EA ﬁxed-eﬀects interacted with a dummy indicating whether the individual
is African or not. The contact job probability estimation accounts for sample selection bias along the
lines of Heckman's model (1979). We then focus on the estimated EA ﬁxed-eﬀects interacted with
the African dummy. Such parameters provide estimates of the ethnic unemployment rate diﬀerential
and the ethnic diﬀerential in the probability of occupying a contact job, both adjusted for observable
individual characteristics and EA ﬁxed eﬀects. In the second step, we regress this set of ﬁxed-eﬀects
on the discriminatory forces at EA level: the local share of Non-Africans and the local share of
contact jobs. We consider a linear combination of them augmented with their interaction.
We obtain two main results. We ﬁnd that the residual ethnic unemployment rate diﬀerential is
larger in EAs where both the proportions of contact jobs and of Non-Africans are high. The bulk
of the eﬀect comes from the interaction of these two proportions. In other words, the presence of
a large number of contact jobs in an EA where there are many Non-Africans is detrimental to the
job opportunities of African workers. Under our identifying assumptions this result indicates the
presence of ethnic discrimination. We also ﬁnd that the residual ethnic diﬀerential in the probability
of occupying a contact job is larger in EAs where the proportion of Non-African residents is large.
According to the second result of our model, this proves the presence of customer discrimination in
the French labor market.
We check the robustness of our result through diﬀerent means. First, we assess the quantita-
tive impacts of our estimates and make several counterfactual experiments. We then discuss the
endogeneity of African location, which is likely to bias upwards our test of discrimination, and per-
form IV estimates, conﬁrming our ﬁndings. We also question our measure of the individual contact
probability and show that it does not aﬀect the relevance of our test of customer discrimination.
We ﬁnally explain why some alternative EA-speciﬁc covariates are not included in our econometric
speciﬁcation.
In contrast to employer discrimination, econometric studies on customer discrimination are
sparse, mainly because consumers' behavior and prejudices are diﬃcult to quantify. A few analyses
of customer discrimination in labor markets use the racial composition of residents in geographical
areas as a proxy for consumer composition of ﬁrms located in those areas. Holzer and Ihlanfeldt
(1998) analyzed the eﬀect of consumer racial composition on the race of newly hired employees,
whereas Giuliano, Leonard and Levine (2009 and 2010) studied the impact of this racial composi-
5EA= zone d'emploi in French
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tion on ﬁrms' sales. There have also been a number of experimental contributions to the customer
discrimination literature: Ihlanfeldt and Young (1994), Kenney and Wissoker (1994) and Neumark
(1996). All found empirical evidence of customer discrimination against racial minorities in the
US. Our paper builds on the key insights from this literature: we also use the local demographic
composition to assess the presence of customer discrimination. However, our approach allows us to
go from the evidence of customer discrimination to unemployment and occupation outcomes for the
minority workers.
The closest paper on the empirical side is Charles and Guryan (2008) who examine how the
distribution of employer prejudice aﬀects the residual black-white wage diﬀerential in the US. They
ﬁrst regress log wages on individual characteristics, state dummies and their interaction with a Black
dummy. They can then explain estimated interacted dummies by a racial intolerance index built
from the General Social Survey. They ﬁnd that one quarter of the residual racial wage gap is due
to prejudice.
2 Test of customer discrimination: Theory
This section presents a two-sector matching model of unemployment with customer and employer
discrimination for workers who only diﬀer by their ethnic group and by their preferences vis-à-vis the
diﬀerent jobs. The model relates the sectorial labor demands, composition of jobs and ethnic groups
as well as discriminatory forces to the ethnic diﬀerentials in unemployment rates and probability of
working in contact with customers. We ﬁrst expose a benchmark model that relies on simplifying
assumptions. We then show that the results of the model are robust to relaxing some of them.
2.1 The model
We describe a two-sector static matching model of the labor market for homogeneous workers who
only diﬀer by their observable ethnic group and by their preferences vis-à-vis the diﬀerent jobs. The
probability of having located an available job is m. Sector 1 is composed of jobs without contact
with consumers, while sector 2 is composed of contact jobs. With probability p, the job is from
sector 2.
All people start non-employed. Job seekers are either African or French native (j= A,F respec-
tively). Total population is normalized to 1, with n French natives and 1-n Africans. Search frictions
forbid workers from ﬁnding a job with certainty and we need to specify the job search process. We
start with the assumption whereby search is undirected and so matching is random. By random
matching we mean two diﬀerent things. On the one hand, a worker may apply for jobs in both
sectors. This assumption is nonessential as we demonstrate in the robustness section. On the other
hand, workers do not perfectly observe the type of employers or consumers. This assumption is
important; if it were not true, workers could direct their search to non-discriminatory jobs.
French natives do not suﬀer from discrimination of any kind. Some French natives may have a
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disutility towards African employees. We disentangle the disutility that comes from hiring an African
employee (employer discrimination) from that which comes from being in contact with an African
worker (customer discrimination). Let ae be the proportion of available jobs whose corresponding
employer has a taste for discrimination and refuses to hire African employees as a result. We assume
that ae is the same in both sectors: the extent of employer discrimination does not vary across
sectors. Let also ac be the proportion of available sector-2 jobs whose customers refuse to interact
with an African employee. We assume that ae and ac are proportional to the French native share n
in the population. Namely, ae = αen and ac = αcn. Employer discrimination arises when αe > 0;
customer discrimination occurs when αc > 0.
Job seekers have sector-speciﬁc preferences whose distribution may diﬀer between ethnic groups.
Let φji denote the proportion of individuals j who accept an oﬀer from sector i. If φ
j
2 > φ
j
1, then
group-j individuals have absolute preferences for contact jobs (sector 2), whereas φF2 −φF1 > φA2 −φA1
means that French natives have relative preferences for such jobs.
The unemployment rate of French natives is only aﬀected by the global availability of jobs
and sectorial preferences. In addition, African workers suﬀer from both customer and employer
discrimination, which aﬀect their employment prospects in speciﬁc ways.
The model sets aside wage and proﬁt determination. We implicitly assume that match surplus is
shared between employer and wage-earner. Match surplus is negative in three cases: discriminating
employer, prejudiced consumers, and when a worker refuses a job oﬀer.
Model outputs. Let piji denote the probability of employment in sector i for a group-j individual.
For a group-j individual, let also qj be the probability of employment in sector 2 conditional on
being employed, i.e. qj = Pr [j works in sector 2 | j works] and uj is the unemployment rate.
For French-native workers, the probability of employment in sector 1 is piF1 = (1− p)mφF1 while
the probability of employment in sector 2 is piF2 = pmφ
F
2 . Therefore, the unemployment rate of
French natives is
uF = 1− piF1 − piF2 = 1− [(1− p)mφF1 + pmφF2 ]. (1)
The conditional probability qF is
qF =
piF2
piF1 + pi
F
2
=
pφF2
(1− p)φF1 + pφF2
. (2)
This probability only depends on the relative supply p/ (1− p) of sector-2 jobs and on the relative
preference φF2 /φ
F
1 of French natives for sector-2 jobs. Neither u
F nor qF depend on discriminatory
forces, αen and αcn.
We turn to African workers. Africans may be discriminated against, which reduces their em-
ployment probabilities. Discrimination may be due to employers (in both sectors) or to consumers
(in sector 2 only). The probability of employment in sector 1 is piA1 = (1 − p)mφA1 (1 − αen) and it
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is piA2 = pmφ
A
2 (1− αen)(1− αcn) in sector 2. The unemployment rate of Africans is:
uA = 1− [(1− p)mφA1 (1− αen) + pmφA2 (1− αen)(1− αcn)]. (3)
The conditional probability qA is then given by
qA =
p (1− αcn)φA2
(1− p)φA1 + p (1− αcn)φA2
. (4)
Unlike the probability for French natives qF , the probability qA decreases with the proportion of
French natives in the overall population when there is customer discrimination, i.e. ∂qA/∂n <
0. As detailed below, this is what allows us to identify customer discrimination from employer
discrimination.
We now discuss more deeply the determinants of the unemployment rate ethnic diﬀerential,
∆u = uA − uF , and of the conditional probability ethnic diﬀerential, ∆q = qA − qF , given by
∆u = m[(1− p)φF1 + pφF2 − (1− p)φA1 (1− αen)− pφA2 (1− αen)(1− αcn)] (UD)
and
∆q =
p (1− αcn)φA2
(1− p)φA1 + p (1− αcn)φA2
− pφ
F
2
(1− p)φF1 + pφF2
. (PD)
We show that equations (UD) and (PD) provide a way to identify discrimination, to disentangle
consumer from employer discrimination.
Overall discrimination and ethnic unemployment rate diﬀerential . The impact of n,
the local share of French natives, on the unemployment rate diﬀerential is given by
∂∆u/∂n = m[(1− p)φA1 αe + pφA2 [αe (1− αcn) + αc (1− αen)]]. (5)
An increase in the proportion of French natives raises the unemployment rate diﬀerential through
two eﬀects: employer discrimination (when αe > 0) lowers job opportunities in both sectors, and
customer discrimination (when αc > 0) further deteriorates job chances in sector 2. The sign of the
impact of the proportion of French natives on the unemployment rate diﬀerential provides a test of
overall discrimination. We can state our ﬁrst result as mentioned in the Introduction.
Claim 1. If ∂∆u/∂n > 0, then ac(n) > 0 or ae(n) > 0.
The unemployment rate diﬀerential also depends on the proportion of contact jobs and equals:
∂∆u/∂p = m[φF2 − φF1 + φA1 (1− αen)− φA2 (1− αen)(1− αcn)]. (6)
The composition of jobs can alter the unemployment rate diﬀerential even though no discrimination
takes place. If αc = αe = 0, then the above expression boils down to:
∂∆u/∂p = m[(φF2 − φF1 )− (φA2 − φA1 )]. (7)
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The diﬀerence in sectorial labor supply due to diﬀerences in preferences between French natives and
Africans may cause ethnic unemployment gaps. This phenomenon occurs when French natives have
a relative preference for contact jobs. For this reason, identifying the existence of discrimination
separately from diﬀerences in sectorial labor supply requires us to study either the direct eﬀect of
the share of French natives, as shown above, or the interaction between the two forces. Indeed,
the model points out the role of the interaction between the proportion of contact jobs and the
proportion of French natives:
∂2∆u/ (∂p∂n) = m[αe
[
φA2 (1− αcn)− φA1
]
+ αcφ
A
2 (1− αen)]. (8)
In the absence of discriminationthat is, αe = 0 and αc = 0this cross-eﬀect should be zero. The
presence of discrimination is evidenced when this crossed partial derivative is nonzero.
Claim 2. If ∂2∆u/ (∂p∂n) 6= 0, then ac(n) > 0 or ae(n) > 0.
If the interaction term is positive, then three clear-cut cases may occur: (i) there is only customer
discrimination, (ii) there is only employer discrimination and Africans have absolute preferences for
working in contact jobs, (iii) Africans have absolute preferences for contact jobs (φA2 > φ
A
1 ), there
are both kinds of discrimination and the magnitude of the preference force is stronger than that of
customer discrimination, namely (φA2 − φA1 )/φA1 > αcn/(1− αcn).
Identifying customer discrimination . Consideration of the unemployment rate diﬀerential
does not allow us to disentangle customer from employer discrimination. In the case of customer
discrimination onlythat is, αe = 0 and αc > 0we have
∂2∆u/ (∂p∂n) = mαc > 0. (9)
However, the derivative is also positive when there is only employer discrimination provided that
Africans have absolute preferences for contact jobs. When αc = 0 and αe > 0, we have
∂2∆u/ (∂p∂n) = m
(
φA2 − φA1
)
αe > 0 (10)
if and only if φA2 − φA1 > 0. The positive impact of employer discrimination is strengthened by the
sectorial preference of African native in this case. The sign of the crossed eﬀect, therefore, does not
allow us to separately identify the role of customer and employer discrimination.
We need to turn to equation (PD) to unambiguously identify customer from employer discrimi-
nation. We have
∂∆q/∂n = − αcp(1− p)φ
A
1 φ
A
2[
(1− p)φA1 + p (1− αcn)φA2
]2 . (11)
This derivative is negative if and only if there is customer discrimination, which leads to our
third claim.
Claim 3. ∂∆q/∂n < 0 if and only if ac(n) > 0
This results from the fact that employer discrimination is at work in both sectors and does not
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aﬀect qA, the conditional probability of working in sector 2 for Africans. In contrast, customer
discrimination aﬀects sector-2 jobs only and therefore does aﬀect qA. Moreover, the conditional
probability of working in sector 2 for French natives is not aﬀected by either type of discrimination.
The proportion of French natives, therefore, negatively aﬀects the diﬀerential conditional probability
only when there is customer discrimination.
Test strategy . Our test strategy uses the 3 claims. We ﬁrst estimate the impact of n and p
and their interaction on ∆u. If the former is signiﬁcantly positive, then there is discrimination. The
interaction term provides an over-identiﬁcation test of the presence of ethnic discrimination, in case
it is nonzero.
We then estimate the impact of n on ∆q. If negative and there is ethnic discrimination, then
there is customer discrimination. If this impact is zero, then there is no customer discrimination;
discrimination is only due to employers and the sign of the interaction term tells us for which sector
Africans have speciﬁc preferences since the interaction term becomes in this case:
∂2∆u/ (∂p∂n) = mαe
[
φA2 − φA1
]
. (12)
2.2 Robustness of the test strategy
The test strategy hinges on several assumptions. We now relax some of them or examine alternative
settings.
Sector-speciﬁc employer discrimination. The link between employer discrimination and
the Non-African proportion does not vary across sectors. This assumption can be relaxed: the
sole requirement is that the intensity of such a link is not stronger in sector 2 than in sector 1.
Otherwise the impact of n on the probability of working in a contact job would not identify customer
discrimination.
To see this, suppose that parameter αe actually diﬀers across sectors, with α1e and α
2
e. Claim 1
would still hold because ∂∆u/∂n > 0 would identify ethnic discrimination. However, Claim 3 would
not hold. Indeed, we would have
∆q =
p (1− αcn)φA2
(1− p) 1−α1en
1−α2enφ
A
1 + p (1− αcn)φA2
− pφ
F
2
(1− p)φF1 + pφF2
. (13)
That ∂∆q/∂n < 0 implies αc > 0 is now true if α1e ≥ α2e. Note that we may fail to detect customer
discrimination in this case. Indeed, we may observe ∂∆q/∂n > 0, whereas αc > 0. However, the
empirical ﬁnding that ∂∆q/∂n < 0 would still be a proof of customer discrimination under the
identifying restriction that α1e ≥ α2e.
Statistical discrimination. The basic model abstracts from statistical discrimination, whereas
such discrimination is very likely and may vary across sectors. In particular, sector-2 jobs require
communication and verbal skills that African workers may lack.6 If such skills are imperfectly
6Lang (1986) shows that language diﬀerences, confusion and misunderstanding can occur when people from diﬀerent
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observable, then employers may be reluctant to hire African workers in such jobs.
It turns out that the consideration of sector-speciﬁc statistical discrimination does not aﬀect
our test strategy provided that the intensity of statistical discrimination does not depend on the
Non-African proportion. Suppose that each African individual suﬀers from statistical discrimination
with probability si in sector i. The probability of getting a job in sector 1 is thus piA1 = m(1 − p)
φA1 (1 − s1)(1 − αen); similarly, the probability of getting a job in sector 2 is piA2 = mpφA2 (1 − s2)
(1−αen)(1−αcn). Positing φ˜Ai = φAi (1−si), we obtain piA1 = m(1−p) φ˜A1 (1−αen) and piA2 = mpφ˜A2
(1− αen)(1− αcn). The model, therefore, is unchanged and Claims 1 to 3 remain valid.
Unlike employer and customer discrimination, we cannot identify statistical discrimination from
ethnic sector-speciﬁc preferences. There are two reasons for this outcome. First, employer and
customer discrimination explicitly refer to individual prejudice vis-à-vis minority workers. Statistical
discrimination is a rational response to a disadvantage that aﬀect minority workers and that cannot
be readily observed; such discrimination may vary across sectors, but should not depend on the
proportion of the majority group. Second, the reason why employers may discriminate statistically
against African workers in contact jobs is because on average they lack the corresponding skills.
This lack of skills is also a good reason for such workers generally to prefer non-contact jobs.
Non-Africans and prejudiced individuals. Both customer and employer discrimination are
proportional to the share of Non-Africans in the population. The idea is that the rates of prejudiced
employers and consumers are constant in the majority group and so there is ethnic discrimination
if and only if the total percentage of prejudiced agents increases with the size of the majority
population.
A natural generalization of our assumption is the following. Let ae = ae(n) and ac = ac(n)
denote the proportions of discriminatory jobs due respectively to employers' and customers' tastes.
We assume that ae(n) > 0 if and only if a′e(n) > 0, and, similarly, ac(n) > 0 if and only if a′c(n) > 0.
Claims 1 to 3 are then unchanged.
The generalized assumption means that there is discrimination of some kind if and only if the
percentage of discriminatory jobs increases with the majority group at the margin. This case nat-
urally arises when the rate of prejudiced individuals in the majority group is constant or increases
with the size of such a group. This is also compatible with cases where prejudice decreases with
the size of the majority group. Formally, let ri(n) be the rate of prejudiced individuals among the
Non-Africans. Then, ai(n) = ri(n)n and so a′i(n) > 0 is equivalent to nr
′
i(n)/ri(n) > −1.
The restriction forbids situations where the Non-African proportion impacts ethnic discrimina-
tion with threshold eﬀects. A less restrictive condition would be a′i(n) > 0 only if ai(n) > 0. Finding
a′i(n) > 0 would still provide evidence of ethnic discrimination. However, this condition would no
longer be necessary and ethnic discrimination might take place even when a′i(n) = 0. The `only if'
part of Claim 3 would no longer hold, but the `if' part would still be true.
Obviously, the identifying assumptions must only be true for the range of observed values of
cultures meet even when one is ﬂuent in the other's language.
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n. For instance, n varies between 92 and 100% in our dataset and so we require that employer
and customer discrimination increase with the majority proportion on this particular support. Any
relationship may emerge outside of this range of values.
Discrimination vs ethnic networks. Many papers use ethnic population density to capture
social interactions within the given ethnic group (see, e.g., Conley and Topa, 2002; Patacchini and
Zenou, 2008). They show that the higher the percentage of a given ethnic group living nearby,
the higher the employment rate of this ethnic group. If we translate this idea to our model, the
proportion of Non-Africans would be considered as a lack of social networks for African immigrants.
We now discuss the implications of this idea for our test strategy.
Social networks aﬀect the job search prospects through two main eﬀects: they help people of
the same ethnic group to overcrowd the others in some of the job queues; they provide information
on available jobs through word-of-mouth communication for instance. The former eﬀect is already
captured by our model speciﬁcation: positive discrimination within ethnic social networks means
that minority workers are actually discriminated against by the majority group and that the extent
of discrimination diminishes with the size of the minority group.
To discuss the latter eﬀect, we slightly modify our model. We consider that the main impact
of the social network is to increase the job search eﬃciency. The African job-ﬁnding probability is
thus mA = ma(n), with a′(•) ≤ 0. The matching probability increases with the number of ethnic
ties, and this eﬀect may come on top of ethnic discrimination. The French job-ﬁnding probability
is mF = m.
The marginal impact of a change in n on the unemployment diﬀerential is now:
∂∆u/∂n = m[(1− p)φA1 αe + pφA2 [αe (1− αcn) + αc (1− αen)]]
−a
′(n)
a(n)
uA. (14)
The ﬁrst term is the same as before; it is nonnegative. The second term reﬂects the fact that
the job search eﬃciency declines with the size of the majority group; it is also nonnegative. So there
are two diﬀerent reasons why the unemployment rate diﬀerential may increase with n: workers may
be discriminated against, or they may beneﬁt from their ethnic social network. Claim 1 is no longer
true as result.
However, the contact job probability q stays unaﬀected. This probability is conditional on being
employed. The factors that aﬀect the overall job-ﬁnding probability do not enter the computation.
It follows that the consideration of social networks does not aﬀect the rest of the test strategy. Claim
3 still holds: ﬁnding ∂∆q/∂n < 0 still identiﬁes the presence of customer discrimination.
Undirected vs directed search. Search is undirected. Is the test strategy robust to the
consideration of directed search? The answer is positive, provided that individuals cannot perfectly
observe employer and consumer types. This assumption means that ﬁrms do not diﬀerentiate jobs
by wage so as to induce workers of a group to send their applications towards jobs of a given wage.
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We here refer once again to the absence of unexplained wage diﬀerentials between Africans and
French natives.
We slightly amend our model. People diﬀer in taste vis-à-vis diﬀerent jobs and reach utility level
µi when they occupy a sector-i job. They must choose a sector ﬁrst and then send an application
for one of the available jobs. Consider a French native and suppose that the matching probability
per application is mi in sector i. This person chooses to apply for a sector-1 job if and only if
m1µ1 > m2µ2. In other words, people self-select on the basis of their comparative advantage. The
proportion of French natives who ﬁnd a job in sector 1 is piF1 = m1 Pr[m1µ1 > m2µ2].
Back to the initial model, we see that the two probabilities coincide whenmpφF1 = m1 Pr[m1µ1 >
m2µ2] and so φF1 = Pr[m1µ1 > m2µ2]. The reduced-form probability φ
F
1 is now endogenous. The
main implication is that we cannot easily identify workers' preferences and job availability because
job availability determines the percentage of people who apply for jobs in each sector.
Africans, unlike French natives, take into account the intensity of discrimination in each sector.
If they observe employer and consumer types, then they do not apply for discriminatory jobs. The
mean employment probability in sector 1 is thus piA1 = m1 Pr[m1µ1 > m2µ2]. The only diﬀerence
with French natives would come from the distribution of sector-speciﬁc utility levels. Now, if Africans
do not perfectly observe employer and consumer types, then they choose to apply for sector-1 jobs
when m1µ1(1 − ae) > m2µ2(1 − ae)(1 − ac). Only customer discrimination aﬀects this condition;
employer discrimination is the same in both sectors and vanishes as a result. The mean employment
probability in sector 1 is
piA1 = m1 Pr[m1µ1 > m2µ2(1− ac)](1− ae). (15)
Therefore, φA1 = Pr[m1µ1 > m2µ2(1−ac)]. Here again we cannot disentangle workers' preferences
from job availability; but the novelty comes from the role of customer discrimination that increases
the proportion of Africans who apply for jobs in sector 1.
We now have
∆q =
p (1− αcn)φA2 (n)
(1− p)φA1 (n) + p (1− αcn)φA2 (n)
− pφ
F
2
(1− p)φF1 + pφF2
, (16)
where φA2 decreases with n and φ
A
1 increases with n whenever there is customer discrimination. The
test strategy is unchanged because ∂∆q/∂n > 0 if and only if there is customer discrimination. How-
ever, customer discrimination now has two eﬀects that reinforce each other: at given participation
in each sector, it reduces recruitment in sector 2; it also reduces participation in this sector because
people expect they will be discriminated against by consumers.
Accounting for job creation. The model leaves aside wage setting and job creation. The
main reason why we do not discuss wages is that Africans and French natives seem to receive equal
pay when they have similar characteristics. However, the demographic composition of a local labor
market could aﬀect the supply of vacancies as well as the relative supply of sector 2 jobs.
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Suppose for instance that there is a matching technology with constant returns to scale and
that the supply of vacancies responds to job proﬁtability. In all generality, both m, the job oﬀer
probability, and p, the proportion of sector-2 jobs, depend on n, the proportion of French natives.
That m depends on n does not aﬀect the test strategy. A glance at equation (PD) reveals that
the conditional probability of working in a sector-2 job does not depend on m. This is true for
both groups of workers. That n aﬀects p modiﬁes equation (PD). Now, a marginal increase in n
may impact the conditional probability of working in a contact job through two eﬀects: stronger
customer discrimination and a marginal change in the relative supply of contact jobs. The sign of
the latter eﬀect is ambiguous.
However, general equilibrium eﬀects induced by the demographic composition of the population
are likely to be very small in our dataset. People with African origins amount to 2 % of the total
population; they never exceed 8% of the total population in a given local labor market.
We now turn to micro data to evaluate the quantitative impact of p and n.
3 Empirical strategy and estimations
This section tests the former model on French data. Our goal is to estimate equations (PD) and (UD)
on individual data. We linearize such equations and empirically estimate the contribution of forces
of discrimination n and p to the individual probability of unemployment u and to the conditional
probability of being in contact q. The French territory is divided into a partition of local labor
markets, characterized by the vector (p, n,m). To use the previous comparative statics exercises, we
must also ensure that the other parameters of the model are not location-dependent. Preferences
are separately captured for Africans and French natives  African immigrants and French natives in
our application  by individual observable characteristics as control variables and the overall eﬀect
of the African dummy. This should let us adequately control for parameters φF1 , φ
F
2 , φ
A
1 , and φ
A
2 .
The matching probability, m, similarly aﬀects both ethnic groups. It is controlled for at the local
level through local ﬁxed eﬀects. We ﬁrst introduce our dataset. We then discuss the econometric
methodology and present our results.
3.1 Data
We use individual data from the 1990 French Census collected by the French National Institute for
Statistics and Economic Studies (Insee), which we supplement with the FQP (Formation et Qualiﬁ-
cation Professionnelle) survey performed in 2003 by Insee to compute the probability of working in
a job in contact with consumers for each occupation. The geographic unit is the Employment Area
(EA), or Zone d'Emploi. EAs are consistent local labor markets; their boundaries are deﬁned so
that most of the people who live in the EA also work there. According to the 1990 French Census,
more than 80% of employed individuals work in their EA of residence.
The 1990 French Census is available at individual and municipality levels. Information on actual
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and former citizenship allows us to identify minority groups. Second-generation African immigrants
who automatically obtain French citizenship cannot be identiﬁed separately from people whose
parents were French. This probably leads to underestimating the scale of discrimination.
We focus on low-skilled males. We consider workers who have at most a high-school diploma
because they are the most exposed to unemployment and the least mobile across EAs;7 we only keep
males to avoid a number of questions related to family arrangements, residential choices, and female
labor market outcomes. We also drop from our sample all individuals who were not living in France
in 1982, as such newcomers may face speciﬁc integration diﬃculties that could bias our empirical
results. Appendix A details the identiﬁcation of French natives and African immigrants and deﬁnes
more precisely our sub-sample of non-newcomers.
The Census details occupations at four-digit level, which unfortunately does not indicate whether
the worker is in contact with consumers or not. Therefore, we need external information to compute
the fraction of contact jobs in each occupation. FQP is an individual-level database which comes
from a survey on a representative sample (39,285 persons) of the French population. The survey
is conducted in face-to-face interviews using Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing. Employed
individuals were asked whether they were in contact with consumers in their jobs. Working indi-
viduals, or people who stopped working less than 5 years ago, answered the question: "Was your
job in direct contact with the public?". The answer was declarative: yes or no. FQP also details
occupations at the four-digit level. Therefore, we can compute the proportion of contact jobs for
each occupation. For statistical reasons we cannot use the four-digit classiﬁcation: there would be
too few persons in a number of occupations. Therefore, we consider the three-digit classiﬁcation.
Turning to the Census, we can attribute to each employee a probability of working in a job in
contact with consumers, which is given by the empirical proportion of contact jobs in the worker's
occupation. Appendix B details the proportion of contact jobs in each occupation.8
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the two sub-populations, African immigrants and French
Natives. The ﬁrst two columns represent the whole sample of both populations and the next four
columns correspond to the sub-sample we use in our empirical part. Table 1 shows that African
workers are over-exposed to unemployment risk. The overall ethnic unemployment rate gap is about
11 percentage points. Part of the gap is explained by skill diﬀerences: ﬁrst-generation Africans are
less likely to reach the highest educational levels than French natives, and are more likely to have
no diploma at all. For instance, less than 10% of them have a high-school diploma (or greater).
As expected, the last two lines of the table show that African immigrants are signiﬁcantly less
7According to the 1990 French Census, individuals who have at most a high-school diploma are three times more
likely to be unemployed than those with a university degree. They also have a lower propensity for mobility: 67% of
high-skilled individuals moved between 1982 and 1990, while the rate falls to 52% for the low-skilled. Mobility rate is
roughly the same between low-skilled French natives and low-skilled African immigrants. However, mobile Africans
tend to stay in the same area: only 22% of low-skilled Africans would move to a diﬀerent city, while the rate reaches
34% for low-skilled French natives.
8One-digit category 1 is excluded since it represents managerial functions and provides too few low-skilled indi-
viduals in each three-digit occupation. One-digit category 2 is also excluded because it represents crafts occupations
and provides too few wage-earner individuals in each three-digit occupation.
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represented in contact jobs than French natives. Half of French have a job in contact, while this
Table 1: Summary statistics: Observable characteristics across ethnic groups
Whole Sample Low-skilled men sub-sample LSM sub-sample, employed
Individual characteristics Africans French Africans French Africans French
Unemployment Rate 18.79 7.18 19.29 7.85 - -
(0.011) (0.014) (0.12) (0.019)
Employment Rate 74.39 89.05 73.86 87.39 - -
(0.12) (0.017) (0.13) (0.023)
Mean age 42.69 38.56 43.77 39.83 43.75 39.47
(0.13) (0.027) (0.15) (0.035) (0.17) (0.037)
University Diploma 4.13 8.11 - - - -
(0.054) (0.015)
2 years graduate Diploma (BAC+2) 2.29 6.42 - - - -
(0.040) (0.014)
HS Diploma (BAC) 3.80 12.04 3.81 14.81 3.97 15.87
(0.052) (0.018) (0.057) (0.025) (0.068) (0.028)
Vocational Diploma (BEP/CAP) 12.16 32.32 11.8 37.62 12.30 39.38
(0.088) (0.026) (0.097) (0.034) (0.11) (0.037)
Junior HS Diploma (BEPC) 3.02 6.82 2.89 8.04 2.97 8.33
(0.046) (0.014) (0.050) (0.019) (0.060) (0.021)
No Diploma 74.59 34.29 81.49 39.53 80.75 36.43
(0.12) (0.027) (0.12) (0.035) (0.14) (0.036)
Proportion of being in contact - - - - 37.99 47.87
(0.18) (0.046)
Observations 137801 3169975 110977 (80%) 1981213 (63%) 81971 (59%) 1731433(55%)
Notes: (i) Sample of the ﬁrst two columns: All men who potentially participate in the labor market (excluded : enrolled in school,
retired, and less than 15); (ii) The sample of the next four columns corresponds to a sub-sample of the ﬁrst two columns: all
low-skilled (who have a high-school diploma or less) men who potentially participate in the labor market, between the ages of 25
and 60; (iii) The sample of the last two columns corresponds to a more restricted sub-sample of the previous columns: all low-skilled
(who have an high-school diploma or less) men wage-earners, between the ages of 25 and 60; (iv) The proportion of being in contact
is the mean of the individual probability of being in contact with consumers over the sample; (v) Standard errors are in brackets;
(vi) The last line represents the number of observations for each column and the corresponding shares of the whole sample in
brackets; (vii) Sources: French Census 1990 and FQP 2003.
rate falls to one third for Africans. Both the unemployment and the contact gaps between French
and Africans are large overall, but also quite variable across locations.
We now explain how the forces of discrimination, the proportion of contact jobs and then the
share of Non-African individuals, are computed at the EA level. The proportion of contact jobs is
the mean individual probability of being in contact with consumers over all persons working in the
EA.9 The theoretical model actually considers the proportion of vacant contact jobs. Because of
data limitations, we cannot have access to this information. Instead, we compute the proportion of
occupied contact jobs.
The share of Non-African individuals is measured using the French Census. As explained above,
our empirical strategy assumes that αethe proportion of prejudiced employers in the population of
Non-Africansand αcthe proportion of prejudiced consumers in the population of Non-Africans
do not diﬀer across local labor markets. Discrimination intensity, therefore, varies across EAs with
9We use work location to determine the relevant EA. For unemployed, we use residential location instead.
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the share of Non-Africans, n, which can be directly computed from the Census.
Table 2 presents summary statistics of ethnic diﬀerentials and discriminatory forces. The un-
employment gap between African natives and French natives is relatively large across EAs with
an average of 13 percentage points. Both the standard deviation and the coeﬃcient of variation
indicate considerable heterogeneity across EAs in terms of ethnic unemployment gaps. The contact
gap between African natives and French natives is also relatively high. Both the standard deviation
and the coeﬃcient of variation indicate a weaker heterogeneity across EAs in terms of ethnic contact
gaps. The proportion of Non-Africans is extremely high: 98% of the total population is Non-African
on average. Both the standard deviation and the coeﬃcient of variation of the share of Non-Africans
are small. Such a weak heterogeneity across EAs is partly due to the deﬁnition of Africans in the
French Census. The African group only contains ﬁrst-generation Africans and, therefore, underes-
timates the total population of Africans. We show below that such a variability is large enough to
identify discrimination and prove its relatively large magnitude. On average 50% of unskilled jobs
are in contact with consumers. This proportion is relatively dispersed across EAs, with a coeﬃcient
of variation which is almost 7 times higher than the coeﬃcient of variation of the proportion of
Non-Africans. Figure 1 maps the residential location of African immigrants across EAs. African
Table 2: Summary statistics: Local ethnic diﬀerentials and discriminatory forces
Mean std dev Min Max Coeﬀ of variation (abs)
∆u 12.8 9.7 -17.9 40.4 0.75
∆q -11.2 5.7 -26.1 4.2 0.51
%Non-Africans 97.9 1.8 92.0 99.9 0.018
%Contact 48.8 6.2 29.9 61.2 0.13
%Contact.%Non-Africans 4770 570 2990 6006 0.12
Notes: (i) Reported statistics give equal weight to each EA; (ii) ∆u and ∆q are the diﬀerences
between Africans and French in the unemployment rate and the probability of being in contact
with consumers. These are computed on EAs that contain at least 50 African immigrants;
(iii) Sources: 1990 French Census, 2003 FQP survey and authors' computations;
immigrants are concentrated in dense areas, especially in the Paris region and in the South East.
This location bias is possibly explained by the unequal distribution of public housing. Most of the
public housing (or HLM: Habitations à Loyer Modéré) supply is located in the deprived outskirts
of large cities. According to the 1990 French Census, African immigrants are overrepresented in the
HLM complex. Near 50% of African immigrants live in HLM, compared to about 15% of French
natives. Figure 2 maps the spatial distribution of low-skilled contact jobs across EAs. It shows that
these unskilled jobs are concentrated in dense EAs, especially in the Paris region and in areas which
attract tourists: South East, South West and Brittany. In these areas, the proportion of low-skilled
jobs in services (restaurants, hotels, shops) is disproportionately high.
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Figure 1: Proportion of African immigrants by Employment Area
3.2 Econometric methodology
Discriminatory forces are measured at the EA level. One diﬃculty lies in disentangling the impact of
discriminatory forces from other eﬀects that take place at the same geographic level. To circumvent
this diﬃculty, we adopt a two-step procedure appealing to EA ﬁxed eﬀects. In the ﬁrst step, we
regress individual labor market outcomes on a set of individual characteristics (among which a
dummy variable for Africans), on EA ﬁxed eﬀects, and on EA eﬀects interacted with an African
dummy that takes the value one if the individual is African and 0 otherwise.10 In the second step,
we regress the estimated EA eﬀects speciﬁc to the Africans on discriminatory forces.
First step. First-step speciﬁcations can be written as:
u∗i = β0 + β1X
1
i + β2Afri + β3Afri.X
1
i + ψ
1
k(i) + ϕ
1
k(i).Afri + ε1i (17)
qi = γ0 + γ1X
2
i + γ2Afri + γ3Afri.X
2
i + ψ
2
k(i) + ϕ
2
k(i).Afri + ρσ2λ̂i + ε2i (18)
where u∗i is a latent variable that captures the probability of being unemployed for individual i ,
qi is its probability of being in contact with consumers, and k(i) the corresponding EA, Xi is the
vector of observed individual characteristics11, Afri is a dummy variable equal to 1 for Africans
10We include an interaction term for every location, except one. Estimating a coeﬃcient for every location auto-
matically gives an estimate of the standard error for each coeﬃcient, which we use to correct for heteroskedasticity in
the second step.
11Explanatory variables are age, age squared, and four educational dummy variables. For the unemployment
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Figure 2: Proportion of low-skilled jobs in contact with consumers by Employment Area
and 0 otherwise, and ε1i and ε2i are mean-zero stochastic error terms representing the inﬂuence of
omitted variables.
The coeﬃcients on the EA-African interactions ϕ1k and ϕ
2
k allow us to compute estimates of
both ethnic unemployment and contact gaps in each EA adjusted for (i) EA factors that aﬀect the
unemployment and contact levels of all local individuals in a similar way and (ii) for ethnic diﬀerences
in individual characteristics and in the returns of these characteristics. The set of coeﬃcients
{
ψ1k
}
provides estimates for the impact of the ratio of available jobs to job-seekers in each EA. Similarly,
the set of coeﬃcients
{
ψ2k
}
provides proxies for the proportion of contact jobs in available jobs.
Note that in equation (17), the African unemployment level in EA k is captured by the coeﬃcient
ψ1k + ϕ
1
k, while the French one is captured by ψ
1
k. In equation (18), the African contact level in EA
k is captured by the coeﬃcient ψ2k + ϕ
2
k, while the French contact level is captured by ψ
2
k.
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Second step. Following our theoretical framework, we regress the estimated coeﬃcients ϕ1k and
ϕ2k on the various discriminatory forces. In the unemployment regression, discriminatory forces are
equation, we add exclusion variables: marital status and the number of children. For the contact equation, we add
occupation dummies at one-digit level.
12Sample selection bias may aﬀect the estimation of model (18). Our theory predicts that sector-speciﬁc preferences
and consumer discrimination aﬀect both the unemployment probability and the probability of working in a job in
contact with consumers. To correct for sample selection bias, we follow Heckman (1979) and include the inverse of
Mills' ratio λ̂i in equation (18). Our dual model is identiﬁed thanks to the introduction into the selection equation (17)
of variables that are intended to have an impact on the unemployment probability but not directly on the probability
of contact with consumers. The variables are the marital status and the number of children.
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the local shares of Non-Africans in the EA, %Non−Africansk, and of jobs in contact, %Contactk.
As the model highlights, the interaction of these forces must also be introduced:
ϕˆ1k = δ0 + δ1%Non−Africansk + δ2%Contactk + δ3%Non−Africansk.%Contactk + υ1k (19)
In the contact equation, the ϕ2k estimates must be regressed on the sole force share of Non-
Africans:
ϕˆ2k = ω0 + ω1%Non−Africansk + υ2k (20)
3.3 Results
We ﬁrst comment on the estimates of our four-equation model, then use them to quantify the
magnitude of the discriminatory forces on ethnic unemployment and contact gaps.
First-step regressions. Table 3 presents results for the unemployment equation (17), while
Table 4 presents results for the contact probability equation (18).13 Individual characteristics provide
expected results in both regressions. In the unemployment regression, a higher education increases
the probability of being employed. For each education level, returns to education for Africans are
lower. Potential experience has a positive and concave impact on employment probability. Married
men are less unemployed than single men (the reference situation). In the contact regression, for both
groups, a higher education increases the probability of being in contact with consumers. However,
when occupations are included, men with high-school diplomas are less in contact than men with
no diploma (the reference situation). The probability of being in contact with consumers increases
with age for French while it decreases for Africans.14 EA ﬁxed-eﬀects capture both the overall
local diﬀerences across EAs in the levels of unemployment and of contact jobs. Appendix D includes
ﬁgures depicting the ﬁxed-eﬀects of the unemployment regression against the EA unemployment rate,
and ﬁxed-eﬀects of the contact job regression against the contact job proportion in each EA. Such
Figures visually depict that for both ethnic groups location is a key determinant of employment and
contact probabilities even when individual characteristics and group-speciﬁc returns to individual
characteristics are controlled for. Local eﬀects interacted with the African dummy capture the
relative unemployment and contact rates of African immigrants. Tables (3) and (4) report summary
statistics for EA ﬁxed-eﬀects. The estimated impacts are very large. An African moving from the
EA at the ﬁrst decile to the EA at the last decile of ﬁxed eﬀects would increase his unemployment
rate by 10 to 20% points (OLS vs Probit) and increase his contact probability by 11 to 13% points.
Figures (3) and (4) confront ethnic gaps at EA level with the corresponding estimated inter-
actions between EA ﬁxed-eﬀects and the African dummy. The white square-shaped dots represent
the coeﬃcients of the interacted ﬁxed-eﬀects when observable characteristics are excluded in the
13Appendix C provides complete ﬁrst-step regressions.
14The Mills' ratio, λ, is signiﬁcantly negative, which suggests that the error terms in the selection equation and
in the contact regression are negatively correlated. Unobserved factors that make participation more likely tend to
be associated with a lower rate of contact with consumers. There is selection since χ2 value for ρ is statistically
signiﬁcant.
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Table 3: Probability of unemployment: ﬁrst-step results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS Probit OLS Probit
Individual controls yes yes yes yes
African 0.81*** 0.70*** 0.57*** 0.75***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.13) (0.096)
EA ﬁxed eﬀects
Inter-decile [−0.050-0.070] [−0.048-0.074]
# >0 at 5% 21 (6%) 20 (6%)
# <0 at 5% 14 (4%) 0 (0%)
EA ﬁxed eﬀects X 'African'
Inter-decile [−0.070-0.14] [−0.029-0.078]
# >0 at 5% 56 (17%) 49 (15%)
# <0 at 5% 70 (20%) 0 (0%)
Observations 1465195 1465068 1465195 1465068
R2 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13
Notes: (i) Standard errors in brackets; (ii) Signiﬁcance: ***: 1%, **: 5%, *: 10% (iii) Sample:
low-skilled men between 25 and 60; (iv) Columns 1 and 3 are a linear probability model and columns
2 and 4 a probit model. (v) Individual controls are age, a quadratic in age, education dummies,
marital status, number of children. All of these are also interacted with the demographic group; (vi)
For ﬁxed-eﬀects, signiﬁcance is calculated relative to the national mean.
Table 4: Probability of being in contact among employees: ﬁrst-step results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Controls : age, diploma yes yes yes yes
Controls : occupations yes yes
African 0.29*** 0.012 -0.010 -0.28**
(0.012) (0.010) (0.18) (0.12)
EA ﬁxed eﬀects
Inter-decile [−0.097-0.034] [−0.050-0.030]
# >0 at 5% 8 (2%) 1 (0.3%)
# <0 at 5% 0 (0%) 39 (11%)
EA ﬁxed eﬀects X 'African'
Inter-decile [−0.066-0.067] [−0.068-0.046]
# >0 at 5% 45 (13%) 30 (9%)
# <0 at 5% 35 (10%) 65 (19%)
Observations 1208837 1208837 1208837 1208837
R2 0.04 0.22 0.084 0.24
Notes: (i) Standard errors in brackets; (ii) Signiﬁcance: ***: 1%, **: 5%, *: 10%; (iii)
Sample: low-skilled wage-earning men between 25 and 60; (iv) Speciﬁcations are corrected
for sample selection bias, using column (2) of Table 3 to compute the inverse of Mill's Ratio;
the Wald test indicates the correlation coeﬃcient between error terms is signiﬁcant at 1% ;
(v) Individual controls are age, a quadratic in age and education dummies. All of these are
also interacted with the demographic group; (vi) For ﬁxed-eﬀects, signiﬁcance is calculated
relative to the national mean.
21
regression, while the black diamond-shaped dots represent the coeﬃcients of the interacted ﬁxed-
eﬀects when observable characteristics are included in the regression. The ﬁtted lines show there is
a strong positive relationship between the raw ethnic unemployment gap and the estimated coeﬃ-
cients of interacted ﬁxed-eﬀects, and between the ethnic contact gap and the estimated coeﬃcients
of interacted ﬁxed-eﬀects. Such a correlation holds whether the regression controls for observable
characteristics or not (the R2 is 0.927 and 0.395 for each regression respectively).
Both ethnic unemployment and contact gaps are largely aﬀected by the characteristics of the
location. Explaining why location matters so much is the purpose of the second-step estimation,
where we put forward the local shares of contact jobs and prejudiced individuals.
Figure 3: Ethnic Unemployment gaps and interacted ﬁxed-eﬀects
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Second-step regressions. Tables 5 and 6 present second-step regression results.15 Table 5
reports the estimated eﬀects from a ﬁrst-step linear probability model (column 3, Table 3), and
Table 6 reports the estimated eﬀects from a probit model (column 4, Table 3). Results are similar
in both cases. The share of Non-Africans has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on African employment
prospects. Following our model, this result shows there is ethnic discrimination in the French labor
market. It is interesting to note that the share of contact jobs has a small explanatory power
when introduced alone, whereas it increases considerably the explanatory power of the model when
introduced next to the share of Non-Africans. This is probably due to its negative correlation with
15Given that the second-step dependent variables are estimated in the ﬁrst-step, errors of the second-step regressions
υ1k are heteroskedastic. Following Card and Krueger (1992), observations are weighted by the inverse of the squared
standard error from the ﬁrst step to take into account this measurement error.
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Figure 4: Ethnic Contact gaps and interacted ﬁxed-eﬀects
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this share. When introduced alone, the model is mis-speciﬁed, the share of contact jobs captures
two eﬀects going in opposite directions, and therefore explains little.
Column 4 of both tables suggests that part of the eﬀect of the proportion of Non-Africans arises
from its interaction with the proportion of contact jobs, with an explanatory power even greater
than in previous columns. According to the model, our favored interpretations of the positive impact
of the interaction term is that either there is only customer discrimination, or there is only employer
discrimination and Africans have absolute preferences of working in contact jobs, or Africans have
absolute preferences for contact jobs, there are both kinds of discrimination and the preference
diﬀerential is stronger than customer discrimination.
Using Table 5, the estimated coeﬃcient allows us to compute that a one-standard-deviation
increase in the proportion of contact jobs increases the adjusted ethnic unemployment gap by .24-.25
of its standard deviation. A one-standard-deviation increase in the Non-African proportion widens
the ethnic unemployment gap by .34-.39 of its standard deviation. The ﬁgures for estimates reported
in column 4 where we consider the interaction term denote a large eﬀect: a one-standard-deviation
increase in the interaction term raises the adjusted gap by 7 times its standard deviation. Table
7 reports second-step regression results from the ﬁrst-step contact regression. The share of Non-
Africans has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on the adjusted ethnic diﬀerential probability of working in
a contact job. Following our theoretical model, this negative impact can be interpreted as evidence
of customer discrimination against African immigrants in the French labor market. Moreover, as we
23
further develop in the next subsection, the magnitude of this eﬀect is large. Controlling or not for
occupations on top of education in the ﬁrst step barely aﬀects the conclusion.
Table 5: Second-step regression results on the probability of unemployment - OLS in ﬁrst step
Speciﬁcations (1) (2) (3) (4)
%Contact 0.0013*** 0.0040*** 0.0038***
(0.000008) (0.000008) (0.00001)
%Non-Africans 0.015*** 0.020*** 0.017***
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00004)
%Contact×%Non-Africans 0.00129***
(0.000005)
Observations 339 339 339 339
R2 0.0069 0.076 0.13 0.15
Notes: (i) Weighted least squares regressions using the inverse of estimated variance of co-
eﬃcients from ﬁrst-step regression reported in Table 3 as weights; (ii) Standard errors in
brackets. Signiﬁcance: ***: 1%, **: 5%, *: 10%; (iii) Columns are estimated using a ﬁrst-
step linear probability model in Table 4.
Table 6: Second-step regression results on the probability of unemployment - Probit in ﬁrst step
Speciﬁcations (1) (2) (3) (4)
%Contact 0.00057*** 0.0013*** 0.0013***
(0.000002) (0.00004) (0.00005)
%Non-Africans 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.011***
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.000012)
%Contact×%Non-Africans 0.00056***
(0.000002)
Observations 321 321 321 321
R2 0.0059 0.12 0.14 0.15
Notes: (i) Weighted least squares regressions using the inverse of estimated variance of co-
eﬃcients from ﬁrst-step regression reported in Table 3 as weights; (ii) Standard errors in
brackets. Signiﬁcance: ***: 1%, **: 5%, *: 10%; (iii) Columns are estimated using a ﬁrst-
step Probit model in Table 4.
3.4 Quantitative implications: counterfactual experiments
One contribution of our paper is to quantify the impact of the discriminatory forces on the African
(male) unemployment rate. To better assess this impact we perform counterfactual experiments
that isolate the impact of prejudice on labor market outcomes. First, we decrease the intensity of
discrimination, i.e. the coeﬃcients δ1 and δ3 in equation (19), by one standard error and compute the
impact on the African unemployment rate. Second, we examine how the African unemployment rate
would be aﬀected if the proportion of prejudiced individuals decreased by one standard deviation.
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Table 7: Second-step regression results on the contact probability
(1) (2)
%Non-Africans -0.0031*** -0.0035***
(0.000004) (0.000003)
Constant 0.53*** 0.59***
(0.0004) (0.0003)
Observations 337 337
Pseudo-R2 0.023 0.038
Notes: (i) Weighted least squares regressions using the inverse of estimated
variance of coeﬃcients from ﬁrst-step regression reported in Table 4 as
weights; (ii) Standard errors in brackets. Signiﬁcance: ***: 1%, **: 5%,
*: 10%; (iii) Columns 1 and 2 are estimated using columns 3 and 4 of the
ﬁrst-step regressions in Table 4, respectively, i.e. controlling or not for occu-
pations on top of education.
By deﬁnition of the African unemployment rate, we have
u =
∑
k
Fkuk, (21)
where Fk is the weight of Africans in area k and uk is the local unemployment rate. From equation
(19), the change in unemployment rate when δ1 and δ3 vary by ∆δ1 and ∆δ3 is:
∆u =
∑
k
Fk[∆δ1%Non−Africansk + ∆δ3%Non−Africansk%Contactk]. (22)
Table 8 reports the results of the ﬁrst experiment. A decrease in discrimination intensity by
one standard deviation diminishes the raw unemployment rate by 18.6% (or 4.3 percentage points).
Almost 90% of the decrease (3.8 points) are due to the direct eﬀect of the share of Non-Africans, while
the remaining 10% (0.5 points) are due to the interaction between the proportion of Non-Africans
and the share of contact jobs. Unemployment rates of French natives and African immigrants
signiﬁcantly converge when the intensity of discrimination decreases since the unemployment gap
decreases by around 20%. The second experiment involves reducing the proportion of Non-Africans
by one standard deviation. The discrimination eﬀect arises from changes in this proportion in each
employment area:
∆u =
∑
k
Fk[δ1∆%Non−Africansk + δ3%Contactk.∆%Non−Africansk]. (23)
Table 9 quantiﬁes this eﬀect. If we reduce the proportion of Non-Africans by one standard deviation,
the raw unemployment rate declines by 15.5 percentage points. Such results conﬁrm the expected
convergence between French natives and African immigrants as the proportion of prejudiced indi-
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Table 8: Counterfactual experiment 1: isolating the impact of discrimination intensity
Raw Unemployment Rate ∆ Employer prejudice ∆ Consumer prejudice Sum of both eﬀects
0.23 -0.038 -0.0048 -0.043
(-16.5%) (-2.1%) (-18.6%)
Notes: The various ﬁgures measure the change in unemployment rate as given by equation (22) when the parameters δ1 and δ2
are decreased by one standard deviation. The raw number is in percentage points, whereas the number within brackets gives the
percentage variation.
viduals decreases.
Table 9: Counterfactual experiment 2 : isolating the impact of the proportion of prejudiced employ-
ers/consumers
Raw Unemployment Rate Diﬀerential
u ∆u
0.23 -0.155
(-67.4%)
Notes: The ﬁgure measures the change in unemployment rate as given
by equation (23) when the share of Non-Africans is decreased by one
standard deviation. The raw number is in percentage points, whereas
the number within brackets gives the percentage variation.
3.5 Robustness checks and limitations of the empirical strategy
Results presented in Tables 5, 6 and 7 provide evidence of customer discrimination in contact jobs.
However, our empirical strategy might face some empirical issues.
Spatial sorting. So far, we have neglected residential choices. There are strong reasons to
consider that workers, and especially Africans, are not very mobile across local labor markets.16 On
the other hand, they probably do not allocate randomly across all possible locations. Therefore,
endogeneity concerns due to reverse causality may aﬀect the relevance of our estimates. African
residential choices may respond to discriminatory forces. Africans would choose to locate in EAs
characterized by a low ethnic unemployment rate diﬀerential or a low proportion of contact jobs.
The OLS estimate of the coeﬃcient on the proportion of Non-Africans would over-estimate the eﬀect
of discrimination due to such endogenous residential behavior.
16Some papers examine the relevance of the spatial mismatch hypothesis (Kain, 1968) for the French labor market.
Gobillon et al (2007) and Gobillon and Selod (2007) show that urban segregation aﬀects unemployment risk. Unlike
our paper, they do not speciﬁcally focus on minority workers, whereas the residential mobility of this population is
constrained and there is evidence of discrimination in the housing market (see, e.g., Combes et al, 2010).
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We address this problem by using an instrumental variable approach mostly based on the 1968
Census. For the ethnic unemployment gap, we consider the following variables: the share of Non-
Africans at this date, the proportion of families with more than 6 members, and the share of
agriculture and industry sectors.
Beyond statistical tests, the choice of such instruments is based on the following considerations.
Past African populations were attracted to locations with favorable labor market characteristics and
avoided those where prospects of employment were less promising. The population pattern today
thus reﬂects the industrial fabric of that time and Africans' preference for certain sectors. A further
inducement to settle would have been the housing conditions available in certain areas for families
with a large number of children. Thirty or so years later, however, the correlation between these
instruments with unemployment patterns no longer holds. In what follows, we provide necessary
over-identiﬁcation and weak instrument tests.
Table 10: Second-step regression results on the probability of unemployment - 2SLS
Speciﬁcations (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV OLS IV
%Contact 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.0038*** 0.0039***
(0.000008) (0.0013) (0.00001) (0.001)
%Non-Africans 0.020*** 0.015** 0.017*** 0.0084
(0.00003) (0.01) (0.00004) (0.008)
%Contact×%Non-Africans 0.00129*** 0.0021***
(0.000005) (0.0008)
J-stat P-Value 0.136 0.258
Cragg-Donald 254.611 108.724
Shea R2 [%Non-Africans] 0.75 0.72
Shea R2 [%Contact×%Non-Africans] 0.73
Observations 339 339 339 339
Notes: (i) Column (1) reports OLS results from Table 5, column (3); In column (2), the proportion of
Non-Africans in 1990 is instrumented by the proportion of Non-Africans in 1968, the proportion of families
with more than 6 members in 1968 and the share of workers in the agriculture and industry sectors across
EAs in 1968; Column (3) reports OLS results from Table 5, column (4); In column (4), the proportion of
Non-Africans and the interaction variable are instrumented by the same variables as in column (2) and their
interactions with the share of jobs in contact with consumers. (ii) Standard errors in brackets. Signiﬁcance:
***: 1%, **: 5%, *: 10%.
2SLS results are presented in Table 10. Columns (1) and (3) report OLS estimates, whereas
columns (2) and (4) report IV estimates. The magnitude and signiﬁcance of the parameters are
very slightly altered. When the interaction variable is included in column (4), the direct eﬀect
%Non−Africans is no more signiﬁcant; however the instrumented interaction eﬀects are even larger
than with OLS and still positively signiﬁcant. The lower part of Table 10 presents two key instrument
tests: an over-identiﬁcation test (Hansen J Statistic) for the exogeneity of the instruments, and a
weak instrument test based on Stock and Yogo (2005). In columns (2) and (4), over-identiﬁcation
tests do not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous at the 10% level. The
CraggDonald statistic (1997) is also well above the Stock and Yogo's threshold corresponding to
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the 10% p-value. On top of the intuitive arguments displayed above, these tests corroborate the
validity of our instrumental strategy.
We similarly proceed for the diﬀerential probability of working in contact with consumers. Un-
fortunately we cannot consider the sectorial composition of jobs as a valid instrument variable. We
manage to instrument the share of Non-Africans in 1990 only with variables related by the character-
istics of the African families and of the local housing markets. We use the share of families with more
than 6 members, the share of small buildings (less than 20 dwellings), the share of under-populated
dwellings17, all three computed in 1968, and the share of social housing, computed in 1982 because
it was not available for earlier periods.
2SLS results are presented in Table 11. Column (1) reproduces the OLS estimates, whereas columns
(2) to (4) show the IV estimates. The coeﬃcients of the instrumented variable are larger (in absolute
value), and still negatively signiﬁcant. The over-identiﬁcation and weak instrument tests continue
to support the validity of the instruments, except for column (4).
Computation of the contact job probability . Strictly speaking we do not observe whether
individuals work in a contact job or not. We rather compute the occupation-speciﬁc probability of
having a contact job. We do so from the three-digit classiﬁcation of occupations available in both the
Census and the FQP survey. The main drawback of this variable is due to the fact that even in high-
contact-rate occupations, African workers might not interact with consumers. Let us consider two
occupations that are particularly well represented among African workers. Occupation `561' contains
waiters, cooks, kitchen helpers, hotel desk clerks, maids and housekeeping cleaners. Occupation `631'
contains electrical and electronics repairers/installers, electronic equipment installers and repairers
(home appliance). In occupation `561', 85% of French-native workers are in contact with consumers,
whereas this rate falls to 61% for ﬁrst-generation African immigrants. Similarly, in occupation `631',
76% of the French natives are in a contact job, while the rate falls to 29% for ﬁrst-generation African
immigrants. These ﬁgures mean that even though employers hire African immigrants in occupations
`561' or `631' that are characterized by a relatively high rate of contact, African immigrants are not
exposed to customers (for instance, they are cleaners, kitchen helpers, or repairers in a repair shop
with no home services).
The fact that our measurement of the contact probability is biased upwards for African workers
does not aﬀect the relevance of the test of customer discrimination. The phenomenon leads us to
underestimate the extent of discrimination, but should not increase the risk of 'false positives'
situations where we conclude there is discrimination while there is not.
Lack of alternative EA-speciﬁc covariates. Our second-step regressions omit typical char-
acteristics of EAs like population density, urban worker proportion, and share of agricultural workers
that have been proven to aﬀect local economic outcomes. We omit these variables for four reasons.
17This share is built from the Indice de sous-peuplement available in Census data. This index depends on the
ratio of number of rooms to number of occupants, both weighted by various factors like age and gender composition
of the household for the numerator, and type of rooms for the denominator. The index takes ﬁve values from highly
under-occupied to highly over-occupied. In each EA we compute the mean percentage of the dwellings that are
reported as highly and weakly under-occupied.
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Table 11: Second-step regression results on the probability of contact - 2SLS
Speciﬁcations (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV IV IV
%Non-Africans -0.0031*** -0.0050* -0.0059* -0.0047*
(0.000004) (0.0028) (0.0035) (0.0028)
Constant 0.53*** 0.74*** 0.83*** 0.73***
(0.00038) (0.28) (0.34) (0.28)
J-stat P-Value 0.547 0.924 0.093
Cragg-Donald 111.258 183.41 73.979
First Shea's partial R2 [%Non-Africans] 0.40 0.52 0.40
Observations 337 337 337 337
Notes: (i) Column (1) reports OLS results from Table 7, column (1); In column (2), the 1990
proportion of Non-Africans is instrumented by the proportion of families with more than 6 members
in 1968 and the spatial distribution of small buildings (less than 20 dwellings) in 1968; In column (3),
the 1990 proportion of Non-Africans is instrumented by the spatial distribution of small buildings
(less than 20 dwellings) in 1968 and the spatial distribution of social housing in 1982; In column (4),
the 1990 proportion of Non-Africans is instrumented by the proportion of families with more than
6 members, the spatial distribution of under-populated areas in 1968 and the spatial distribution of
small buildings (less than 20 dwellings) in 1968; (ii) Standard errors in brackets. Signiﬁcance: ***:
1%, **: 5%, *: 10%.
First, such variables certainly aﬀect the overall probability of having a job as well as the overall
probability of working in contact with the customers. First-step regressions include EA ﬁxed-eﬀects
and so we control for these eﬀects. Second, these variables are strongly correlated with the dis-
criminatory forces we highlight throughout the paper. Namely, the proportion of contact jobs (the
percentage of Non-Africans) increases (decreases) with population density and urban worker pro-
portion, whereas it decreases (increases) with the share of agricultural workers. Including these
variables would probably aﬀect our results; but it would be very diﬃcult to understand by which
channels and what would be the correctly speciﬁed model. Third, we do not include these covariates
because we do not have a proper theory for their inclusion. At the very least, the share of urban
or agricultural workers can be seen as other proxies for the proportion of contact jobs. Similarly,
and as far as discrimination is concerned, population density calls for underlying factors correlated
with population density. Among them, of course, the proportion of contact jobs and the share of
Non-African workers. Fourth, if the problem of these covariates is not an interpretational one but
simply corresponds to an omitted variable problem, it is solved by the 2SLS estimation. It corrects
not only for possible reverse causality but also for all omitted eﬀects that would be correlated to
both the share of Non-Africans and the variables explaining the local unemployment rate and the
probability of being in contact with consumers.
4 Conclusion
The paper investigates the link between the over-exposure of African immigrants to unemployment
in France and their under-representation in jobs in contact with customers. From a methodolog-
ical perspective, we provide a test strategy to detect customer discrimination in survey data and
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quantify its employment impacts that can be useful in various respects. We start with a two-sector
matching model with two ethnic groups, ethnic sector-speciﬁc preferences, economy-wide employer
discrimination, and sector-speciﬁc customer discrimination. We run the test on French individual
data in a cross-section of Employment Areas and focus on low-skilled male African immigrants. Our
results indicate that there is customer discrimination in the French labor market for contact jobs
and that discrimination in general explains a substantial part of residual unemployment disparity.
A decrease in discrimination intensity by one standard deviation would reduce the raw unemploy-
ment rate of African immigrants by 4.3 percentage points, whereas these immigrants experience an
unemployment rate 11 percentage points higher than French natives.
Our work could be extended in several directions. On the theoretical side, wage setting and
the labor demand could be made endogenous so as to predict the sectorial composition of jobs by
EA. We could use such an enriched model to instrument (or to justify existing instruments for)
the proportion of contact jobs in second-step regressions. In the same vein, we could try to model
imperfect residential mobility between EAs. The demand for goods from the contact job sector
could also be analyzed. Individual demand should depend on income. Customer discrimination
would then respond to aggregate income for the minority workers. On the empirical side, the test
strategy could be applied to alternative datasets. Unlike France, there is residual wage disparity
between ethnic groups in the US and so we need a version of the model where wages are endogenous.
It would be interesting to assess whether the contact job proportion aﬀects the residual BlackWhite
wage diﬀerential.
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Appendix
A Dataset
The French Census (1990) is available both at the individual and city level. The 1990 Census
full sample includes a quarter of the total French population (1,417,6821 observations). Table 12
describes the ethnic groups that we construct in this paper. Information on individuals' citizenship
(actual and former) allows us to identify minority groups. Unlike the Labor Force survey, the
Census does not provide this type of information for the parents. Consequently, we only consider
ﬁrst-generation African immigrants: persons who were born in Africa with an African country
citizenship at birth. Unfortunately, second-generation immigrants belong to the group of French
natives. Table 13 describes the construction of the male low-skilled worker sample used in this
paper.
Table 12: Ethnic groups in the 1990 French Census (Full sample)
Ethnic groups Observations Percentage
French natives 12,726,437 91.64%
Africans 412,659 2.97%
Europeans 632,531 4.55%
Others 115,392 0.84%
Notes: (i) French natives are born French at birth; (ii) Africans that we consider
are born in Africa and can either have foreign citizenship or have French citizenship
(by acquisition); (iii) Europeans considered are born in Europe and can either have
foreign citizenship or have French citizenship (by acquisition); (iv) Source: 1990
French Census.
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Table 13: Restricted sample of the 1990 French Census
Full Sample 14,176,821
Restrict to men who live in France between the ages of 25 and 60 3,318,643
Exclusion criteria
Neither African nor French 263,493
Non working (Retired, military, enrolled in school) 164,700
Diploma > High-School level 518,366
In Public Sector 736,779
Self-employed 446,183
Not in France in 1982 68,419
Not in relevant occupations 699,175
Final sample 1,376,176
French natives 1,277,420 (92.82%)
Africans 98,756 (7.18%)
Low-skilled workers in the private sector 1,087,179 (79.74%)
Unemployed individuals 278,813 (20.26%)
Notes: (i) The exclusion criteria are not mutually exclusive, so many observations show up in multiple rows; (ii)
Irrelevant occupations include public occupations or high-skilled occupations; (iii) French natives are born French;
(iv) Africans are born in Africa and can either have foreign or French citizenship (by acquisition); (v) Source : 1990
French Census.
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B Proportion of contact jobs by occupation
Table 14: Proportion of contact jobs by occupation
Occupation % ContactOccupation % Contact
Liberal Professions (3)
Journalists/ Writers 0.571 Managers (Hotel & food service) 0.8
Managers (publishing, entertainment) 0.524 Technical Directors/managers 0.5
Craft artists, Musicians, Dancers 0.821 Engineering Managers (R & D) 0.560
Managers 0.638 Engineering Managers (production) 0.486
Administrative services Managers 0.483 Engineering Managers (maintenance) 0.522
Public Relations & Sales Managers 0.776 Engineering Technicians (electrical) 0.93
Managers (Bank & Insurance) 0.660 Engineering Technicians (logistics) 0.5
Intermediate occupations (4)
Nurses 0.935 Medical technicians and specialists 0.809
Medical & Public health social workers 0.84 Exec Secretaries & Admin Assistants 0.526
Sales Agents/Representatives 0.869 Technical Assistants (communication) 0.614
Transportation Admin Managers 0.638 Technical Assistants (insurance) 0.712
Technical Assistants (Hotel) 0.638
Technicians
Agricultural 0.667 Electricians 0.426
Mechanical 0.189 Construction and Building 0.647
Metal 0.189 Printing 0.381
Production 0.468 Miscellaneous 0.625
First-Line Supervisors
Agricultural 0.412 Electricians 0.400
Mechanical 0.439 Construction and Building 0.641
Chemistry, Food Industry 0.284 Metal 0.284
Distribution 0.341 Maintenance 0.438
Miscellaneous 0.571
Clerks / Oﬃce Workers (5)
Secretaries 0.705 Accountants, ﬁnancial oﬃcer 0.398
Clerks (Bank, Insurance) 0.543 Transportation clerks 0.832
Shop clerks 0.949 Gas pump attendants 0.958
Waiters, Cooks, Desk Clerks 0.807 Hairdressers, Manicurists 0.986
Child/Home Care Workers, Concierges 0.748
Operators/workers (6)
Skilled (industrial)
Maintenance 0.247 Electricians 0.112
Continued on Next Page
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Table 14  Continued
Occupation % ContactOccupation % Contact
Production : Metal 0.124 Production : Mechanical 0.111
Production : Construction & Building 0.445 Production : Processing 0.098
Production : Processing 0.033 Production : Textile 0.171
Production : Printing 0.171 Production : Woodworking 0.239
Skilled (Craft)
Gardeners 0.644 Electricians 0.724
Mechanical/Metal 0.674 Woodworking 0.553
Construction & Building 0.600 Food Industry 0.520
Textile 0.378 Artists 0.456
Drivers (Bus, Truck, Taxi) 0.770
Skilled (Misc)
Handling 0.316 Transportation 0.417
Ship & Boat Captains 0.400
Unskilled (industrial)
Electricians 0.082 Mechanical/Metal 0.061
Construction and Building 0.216 Processing 0.057
Processing 0.034 Textile 0.0826
Woodworking/Recycling 0.078
Unskilled (Craft)
Mechanical/metal 0.606 Construction and Building 0.405
Food Industry 0.357 Janitors/Misc 0.378
Agricultural/Fish Workers
Farm workers 0.198 Fishers 0.133
Notes: (i) Sample: low-skilled (who have a high-school diploma or less) wage-earning men in the private sector; (ii) One-digit
occupations are in bold; (iii) Source: 2003 FQP survey.
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C First-Step Results
Table 15: Probability of unemployment: ﬁrst-step results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age -0.022*** -0.018*** -0.022*** -0.018***
(0.00015) (0.00014) (0.00015) (0.00014)
Age Squared 0.00035*** 0.00029*** 0.0005*** 0.0029***
(0.000002) (0.000002) (0.0000018) (0.0000017)
Junior HS Diploma -0.053*** -0.041*** -0.052*** -0.041***
(0.000657) (0.00054) (0.00065) (0.000536)
Vocational Diploma -0.087*** -0.082*** -0.083*** -0.078***
(0.00035) (0.00032) (0.00035) (0.00032)
HS Diploma -0.101*** -0.085*** -0.096*** -0.080***
(0.00051) (0.00037) (0.00051) (0.00037)
Married -0.18*** -0.19*** -0.18*** -0.19***
(0.00036) (0.00042) (0.00356) (0.00042)
One Kid 0.0035*** -0.00092** 0.0016*** -0.0024***
(0.00042) (0.00041) (0.00042) (0.00041)
Two Kids -0.00098** -0.015*** -0.0025*** -0.016***
(0.00045) (0.00045) (0.00045) (0.00045)
More than 2 Kids 0.085*** 0.083*** 0.079*** 0.077***
(0.00049) (0.00057) (0.00049) (0.00056)
African×Age -0.031*** -0.17*** -0.029*** -0.016***
(0.00064) (0.00055) (0.00064) (0.00054)
African×Age Squared 0.00029*** 0.00013*** 0.00027*** 0.00012***
(0.0000075) (0.000006) (0.0000074) (0.0000063)
African×Junior HS Diploma 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.037*** 0.036***
(0.0036) (0.0026) (0.0036) (0.0037)
African×Vocational Diploma 0.032*** 0.051*** 0.021*** 0.040***
(0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0021)
African×HS Diploma 0.057*** 0.084*** 0.059*** 0.083***
(0.0032) (0.0038) (0.0032) (0.0038)
African×Married 0.025*** 0.077*** 0.030*** 0.082***
(0.0072) (0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0018)
African×One Kid -0.0073*** -0.0018 -0.0087*** -0.0024
(0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0020)
African×Two Kids 0.0015 0.013 -0.0012*** 0.012
(0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0021)
African×More than 2 Kids -0.032*** -0.036*** -0.027*** -0.032***
(0.0015) (0.0011) (0.015) (0.0011)
African 0.81*** 0.70*** 0.57*** 0.76***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.13) (0.096)
EA ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes
EA ﬁxed eﬀects×'African' yes yes
Observations 1465195 1465068 1465195 1465068
R2 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13
Notes: (i) Standard errors in brackets; (ii) Signiﬁcance: ***: 1%, **: 5%, *: 10% (iii) Sample:
low-skilled men between 25 and 60; (iv) Columns 1 and 3 are a linear probability model and
columns 2 and 4 a probit model.
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Table 16: Probability of being in contact among employees: ﬁrst-step results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
African 0.29*** 0.012 -0.010 -0.28**
(0.012) (0.011) (0.18) (0.12)
Age 0.00064*** -0.0037*** 0.0011*** -0.0034***
(0.00012) (0.00011) (0.00012) (0.00011)
Age Squared 0.000014*** 0.00004*** 0.000007*** 0.000036***
(0.0000016) (0.0000014) (0.0000015) (0.00000112)
Junior HS Diploma 0.13*** 0.020*** 0.11*** 0.014***
(0.0025) (0.00049) (0.00052) (0.00048)
Vocational Diploma 0.027*** -0.00071** 0.022*** -0.0029***
(0.00032) (0.00029) (0.00032) (0.00029)
HS Diploma 0.14*** -0.015*** 0.12*** -0.019***
(0.00043) (0.00043) (0.00043) (0.00042)
African×Age -0.014*** -0.0027*** -0.013*** -0.0016***
(0.00056) (0.00050) (0.00055) (0.00049)
African×Age Squared 0.00013*** 0.000028*** 0.00011*** 0.000013***
(0.0000065) (0.0000058) (0.0000064) (0.0000058)
African×Junior HS Diploma 0.0037 0.023*** 0.0054* 0.026***
(0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0027)
African×Vocational Diploma 0.018*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.032***
(0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0015)
African×HS Diploma 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.032***
(0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0026)
Occupation group 3 0.27*** 0.26***
(0.00045) (0.00045)
Occupation group 4 0.22*** 0.22***
(0.00029) (0.00030)
Occupation group 5 0.33*** 0.32***
(0.00045) (0.00045)
African×Occupation group 3 0.037*** 0.024***
(0.0038) (0.0037)
African×Occupation group 4 0.049*** 0.0401***
(0.0021) (0.0021)
African×Occupation group 5 0.12*** 0.11***
(0.0019) (0.00039)
EA ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes
EA ﬁxed eﬀects×'African' yes yes
Observations 1208837 1208837 1208837 1208837
R2 0.04 0.22 0.08 0.24
Notes: (i) Standard errors in brackets; (ii) Signiﬁcance: ***: 1%, **: 5%, *: 10%; (iii) Sample:
low-skilled wage-earning men between 25 and 60; (iv) Both speciﬁcations are corrected for sample
selection bias, using column (2) of Table 3
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D Graphics: estimated Employment Area ﬁxed-eﬀects and labor
market outcomes
Figure 5: EA ﬁxed-eﬀects of the unemployment regression
Notes: (i) The ﬁgure reports the EA ﬁxed eﬀects of the ﬁrst-step unemployment regression (3), (ii) Each point
represents the estimated coeﬃcient of each EA by unemployment rate, the ﬁgure gives equal weight to each EA; (iii)
The solid line shows the ﬁtted values, and the grey area shows the conﬁdence interval at 95% ; (iv) Source: 1990
French Census, 2003 FQP survey, and authors' computations.
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Figure 6: EA ﬁxed-eﬀects of contact rate regression
Notes: (i) The ﬁgure reports the EA ﬁxed eﬀects of the ﬁrst-step contact rate regression (4), (ii) Each point represents
the estimated coeﬃcient of each EA by contact rate, the ﬁgure gives equal weight to each EA; (iii) The solid line
shows the ﬁtted values, and the grey area shows the conﬁdence interval at 95% ; (iv) Source: 1990 French Census,
2003 FQP survey, and authors' computations.
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